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Summary: The paper focuses on basic description of the tunnel as a telematic object and its architecture. Conventional 
methods of risk analysis of telematic objects are introduced in relation to their safety. New approaches of risk quantification 
are shown in connection to existing legislation and directives of European Commission.  
 
 
1. TELEMATICS AND INTELLIGENT 
TRAFFIC SYSTEMS 
 
Telematics is a systematic engineering field, dealing 
with creation and purpose-made utilization of 
information environments for homeostatic processes 
of territorial complexes, up to global field network. 
Telematics results from convergence and subsequent 
combination of telecommunication technologies and 
informatics with support of management economy 
and mathematical methods for creation and control 
of complex systems. The effects of telematics is 
shown in wide spectrum of user area, from 
multimedia communication of individuals up to 
intelligent application and control of global network 
fields such as transport, connections and public 
administration. 
Intelligent traffic system integrates information and 
telecommunication technologies into traffic 
engineering with support of other related subject 
fields (economics, traffic theory, etc.) so that 
increases traffic performance, safety and comfort of 
transport.  
Practically traffic telematics represents information 
and telecommunication support of traffic process. 
Detailed explanation can be found e.g. in [1]. 
 
2. THEORETICAL PART 
 
Tunnel as a telematic system  
 
Tunnel is a traffic system which works with large 
amount of data.  In the system there are measured: 
- Traffic data,  
- Technological data, 
- Weather conditions, 
- Ecological conditions. 
Besides it is necessary to reliably transfer verbal 
information from SOS boxes and television 
surveillance is of high significance level too. Large 
amount of data is related to use of security system 
(emergency push button, automatic call point) and 
more over data from own technology is joined to 
ensure ventilation, illumination, etc. In case of the 
tunnels it is necessary not just to communicate 
reciprocally with gateways, police dispatching, but 
also to ensure relations from control point of view. 
The tunnel equipped with relevant technologies is 
one of the fundamental telematic subsystems and has 
to be integrated into the central traffic control centre 
of the telematic system. 
 
Tunnel system architecture 
 
Traffic telematics point of view describes tunnel 
architecture on the base of user’s requirements. 
According to [2], the architecture is split into the 
following parts: 
Functional – forms and defines individual element, 
module and subsystem functions including relations 
between them and thereby allows forming 
applications; 
Informational – defines principles of creation the 
structure of relevant informational subsystem 
including requirements for allocation, coding and 
transfer of information; 
Physical – defines physical equipments which 
perform single functions to ensure functionality of 
applications hence assigning individual elements, 
modules and subsystems defined in functional 
architecture to relevant physical equipment; 
Communicational – describes system information 
transport in relation to the physical architecture. 
 
Graphical interpretation of this classification is 
shown in figure 1. The tunnel system at the bottom 
layer is represented by physical reality: actual 
tunnel, interactions, buildings, equipment… 
Second layer represents detailed subdivision to 
physical systems and devices. On the base of this 
division it is possible to visualize physical model 
which should not be connected with concrete 
elements or suppliers but should be as general as 
possible. 
The abstract description takes place in the top layer 
where functions are assigned to the physical entities, 
relations between functions are defined and 
information flows help to define communication 
architecture. Whole activity is ensured by 
organizational configuration which the organization 
architecture is created by. 
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The tunnel technology consists of hierarchical 
subsystems: safety, ventilation, lighting, traffic, 
control system, operation. Each of those subsystems 
has its own architecture. 
The source of information is technological 
equipment of tunnel. It is a regulated system 
consisting of individual functional complex sensors 
and acceptors – the output elements intermediating 
contact with drivers. The basic functional complexes 
of tunnel are traffic subsystem, safety and technical 
subsystems ensuring tunnel functionality. System 
behaviour is determined by the central control 
system according to predetermined models. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Tunnel system architecture 
 
For proposing of functional complexes there are 
used exact procedures (calculation, simulation, 
modelling) or expert methods (use of statistical 
methods for analysis of historical events, assessment 
carried out by experts, fuzzy rules implementation 
into decision processes). The advantages of this 
group of methods are proved by solving 
extraordinary situations (fire, accident). 
The most important factors participating on total risk 
level which are endangering traffic participants 
using the highway tunnel are [2]: traffic participants 
discipline, reliable and safe function of tunnel 
technology, correct and coordinated dispatching 
activity, regular accountable prophylaxis, 
diagnostics and maintenance of tunnel subsystem 
components, quality of technical personnel 
operation, immediate traffic state (density and 
composition), weather conditions and finally the safe 
condition of technologies in extraordinary situations, 
circumspectly behaviour of participants, fast and 
organized intervention of integrated rescue services. 
 
Concept of the risk 
 
Systems in which failure can cause dangerous or 
hazardous state are usually termed as safety-critical 
systems (SCSs) or safety-related systems (SRSs). 
SRSs come under the group of critical processes. 
Control of critical processes is set apart from control 
of conventional (non-critical) processes by selection 
of assortment of resources that enables to 
predetermine behaviour of the system when the 
specific group of failures occurs. SRSs claim 
extraordinary consistency in stage of their 
specification and design to prevent errors in its 
realization. Hazard is a source of jeopardy (harm) 
and risk is the measure of this jeopardy. Situation or 
state of the system in which some predictable 
possibility of harming of persons or physical 
elements of the system exist is mostly considered as 
hazard. It is impossible to speak about harming in 
the system where no hazard is. Also it is not possible 
to evaluate risk which is represented by harm if there 
is no harm. The term risk R is used for quantitative 
or qualitative evaluation of possibility of harming. It 
is usually defined as affect or consequence of 
undesirable event occurrence per time unit [3]. 
These are basic values which are standardized (e.g. 
passenger per kilometre etc.) and simple 
mathematical model (1) can be deduced out of them. 
The model is common in risk analysis and it is used 
for systematic and objective expression of 
quantitative intensity of risk. 
 
R = HR V   (1) 
 
The risk arising from i-th event occurrence Ui can be 
expressed: 
RUi = HRi  Vi   (2) 
 
Total risk which represents event occurrence is: 
 
R = (HRi Vi)         ! Raccept  (3) 
 
The acceptable risk (Raccept) of the system is 
represented as multiplication of intensities HRi and 
consequences Vi. It has to be less or equal to risk 
which is admissible in the analyzed system.  
 
3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RISK 
DEFINITION 
 
In technical and scientific literature the risk itself is 
informally expressed by many manners. Most 
frequently as probability of undesirable event 
occurrence, subsequence of undesirable event 
occurrence and probability of undesirable event 
occurrence multiplied by its consequence. The third 
one is most used, because in practice it takes in 
consideration both probability of occurrence and the 
consequences.  
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Safety chain 
 
Integrated safety for tunnels is often presented as a 
so-called ‘safety chain’ – figure 2. It is considered 
inefficient to focus on the improvement of the safety 
performance of only one link, without consulting the 
safety performance of the other links. 
The safety chain consists of the following links: 
- Pro-action: avoids unsafe situations in a tunnel by 
the elimination of all root causes. This includes the 
structural and operational safety measures during the 
planning phase before construction of new tunnels or 
refurbishment of in-service tunnels; 
- Prevention: reduces tunnel accident probabilities; 
- Mitigation: mitigates the consequences of a tunnel 
accident as much as possible. This includes taking 
measures in the case of an accident, enabling the 
tunnel users to rescue themselves (self-rescue) 
before the rescue teams arrive; 
- Preparation: represents the emergency 
preparedness (such as the training of rescue 
personnel); 
- Repression: makes sure that adequate support by 
public rescue teams will be provided in the case of 
serious consequences after an accident; 
- After-care: does all that is needed to return to 
‘normal’ (e.g. assistance to victims and settlement of 
damage). 
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Fig. 2. Safety chain 
 
Shape of the chain has to adapt to requests of safety 
measures of the actual risk. Prevention is of course 
of primary importance, and therefore this link is 
bigger than the others. In practice it is not always 
possible to prevent all events, therefore when an 
accident or fire has occurred, the most effective 
response is self-rescue (mitigation) of users inside 
the tunnel. Hereby the consequences of an accident 
will be reduced because the rapid development of a 
fire can make any intervention ineffective after e.g. 
ten minutes, and emergency services cannot 
generally reach the fireplace in such a short time. 
Hence, it is inefficient to focus on improvement of 
the safety performance of only one link, without 
consulting the safety performance of the other links. 
It is obvious that such a narrow focus will not 
enhance the strength of the total chain. An 
acceptable resistance of the chain to “unsafety loads 
(L)” (tunnel system safety demand) can only be 
created by enhancing the “unsafety resistance (R)” 
(tunnel system safety performance) of each link of 
the chain and therefore the emphasis is put on 
strength of the total chain. 
Causal chain 
 
Another graphic form used to express the tunnel 
safety aspects is the causal chain. In most cases, 
accidents are determined by certain pre-conditions 
(causes) and the accident development processes 
determine the seriousness of the accident effects. 
This can be expressed graphically by regarding the 
accident as a nodal point between the pre-conditions 
(causes) and the effects (consequences) by the chain 
with Causes–Accident–Effects, called the Bow Tie 
Model.  
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Fig. 3. Bow Tie Model 
 
Both tie sides contain the points of action to 
influence the events before or after the incident. On 
the left side, attention should be given to accident 
prevention (for instance brake overheating of 
trucks). On the other side, the mitigation (for 
instance of a small fire turning into a large fire) and 
suppression of accident effects (such as smoke or 
toxic gasses) is of crucial importance. 
 
An integrated approach for road tunnel safety 
 
An integrated approach to tunnel safety means 
taking into consideration at what point in the safety 
chain the necessary activities take a start and which 
parties and departments should be involved during 
the life of a tunnel.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Schematic representation of integrated safety 
system 
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Figure 4 shows a schematic representation of the 
integrated approach to tunnel safety as developed by 
the Centre for Tunnel Safety of the Dutch Ministry 
of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. 
This approach takes in consideration not just the 
technical measures and security management but 
also possibilities to self rescue of the tunnel users 
and response to situations of emergency and 
collision. Created computing model allows realizing 
quantitative risk analysis of tunnels including car 
fires, leakage of dangerous goods, traffic 
congestions, timely detection effects, various 
ventilation strategies, manual or automatic action of 
operator or control system and man escape strategy. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
In general for risk assessments there are used 
quantitative and qualitative methods.  
For quantitative (numeration) risk assessment tree 
diagrams are used in world scale. These diagrams 
are relatively complicated and their limit lies in 
subsuming a large set of variables influencing the 
safety in to the risk assessment. It makes the 
diagrams very chaotic. This type of analysis is very 
detailed and therefore requires most of the time 
which makes the research very expensive. 
The other method (qualitative) is pretty original and 
heretofore it was not published in world scale. The 
core of the method is that it utilizes tree diagrams for 
the qualitative assessment but it significantly 
reduces the problem dimension which makes the 
method very transparent and easy to repeat. The 
problem reduction lies in the use of expert method 
based on fuzzy approach.   
For qualitative risk assessment the unified modeling 
language (UML) can be used. UML is a graphic 
representation of the common safety concept which 
is applicable for any of road tunnels. It allows to 
research situations of type of a fire or accident with 
injuries by object oriented approaches based on state 
models and models representing system dynamics. 
These are basis for risk analysis in the form of 
scenario analyses or analyses based on probabilistic 
trees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The safety of traffic and traffic systems is expressed 
as condition when the risk of harming of human 
health or the material damage is eliminated to the 
acceptable level. Safety has become one of the 
crucial criterions in traffic quality assessment. 
System of traffic quality assessment uses whole 
series of indicators which are mostly reciprocally 
conditioned or supported by each other.  
The paper is introductory paper to dissertation thesis 
of the first author which engages with creation of 
new theoretical apparatus for analysis and 
assessment of road tunnels risk. Present contribution 
lies in analysis of present approaches to definition, 
quantification and assessment of risks. Further 
process is to deal with question of assessing of 
approaches, description and modelling of the system 
from process dynamics perspective and developing 
of theoretical apparatus for reduction of problem 
dimension. Last steps should be the quantitative risk 
analysis and formulation of the risk assessment 
methodology. 
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